![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() If/when the government intercepts (and records) iOS-to-iOS packet data that it has a need to decrypt, then Apple can assist either by providing BDpriv (not such a good idea), or better yet, simply by using BDpriv to decrypt the data, but without ever handing over BDpriv to anyone.The receiving iOS device ignores (tosses) part B, which it can’t decrypt anyway, and uses SK (which it already has) to decrypt part A, the user data.So each packet contains (A) user data encrypted with SK, and (B) SK encrypted with BDpub. When two iOS devices have successfully negotiated a temporary session key (SK) for a secure communication session, then they include SK along with each packet of communication, but in an encrypted form: specifically, encrypted with BDpub.Apple includes the corresponding public key, BDpub, in iOS.Apple creates a private key BDpriv (backdoor private) known only to Apple, and keeps this in a secure location (like a vault).The purpose of this article is to argue that no, the above argument is incorrect, and a secure, emergency backdoor can be created. If anyone can get in, bad guys will get in.” FOR the record, I’m fine with Apple’s policy of providing secure, end-to-end encryption with no backdoor for the government, Apple, or anyone else.īut to play devil’s advocate just a little: One of the anti-backdoor arguments being bandied about is, “Even assuming we trust our government to use a backdoor for legitimate purposes only, and only when necessary, I don’t believe that Apple can create a backdoor for our government that wouldn’t also open the door to skilled hackers, and to other governments. ![]()
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